The Workplace Investigation and the Law Part 3

(In this piece I will discuss cases which stray beyond the ‘pure’ investigation, please see earlier posts for full paper)

A second, and related point is that, in my submission (and despite the comfort that may be found in the foregoing case law) investigators should think twice about assignments where the terms of reference take them beyond the pure investigation described there.

 That brings me to the following cases where precisely that problem arises.

McLoughlin v Setanta Insurance Services Ltd 2011 [IEHC] 401 Injunction granted

Giblin v Irish Life & Permanent PLC [2010] IEHC 36

O’Sullivan v. Mercy Hospital Cork Limited, [2005] IEHC 170

These are all cases where to one extent or another the investigation process was compromised by breaches of fair procedure, the breach activated by the fact that they moved beyond the Minnock ‘pure investigation’ principle and into sanction.

It should be noted that some form of combined investigation/disciplinary step is not ruled out per se.

In Giblin Laffoy J. said that a one stage ‘inquisitorial process’ was possible.

It is not to be inferred from this decision that I consider that it is not appropriate for executives of the defendant who are involved in the human resources aspects of the defendant’s management to conduct the type of investigation which was conducted in relation to the plaintiff. Nor is it to be inferred that I am of the view that the person or persons who conduct the “thorough investigation” to be conducted under para. (iv) of the Disciplinary Procedures in all cases should not be the decision maker as to whether the conduct of the employee being investigated warrants a serious sanction such as dismissal. A one stage inquisitorial process may be appropriate in many cases.

This may be a matter of terminology but it is certainly confusing (to non lawyers anyway) to describe what is essentially an adjudication as an investigation and it would of course require the full application of the fair procedure requirements. (Although I am aware of a process within a large multinational where an internal appeal against redundancy is described as ‘an investigation appeal’).

 But in all these cases there were defects.

In McLoughlin the investigators were held to have produced a reasoned determination of the case, in Giblin the investigation team was charged with deciding on Mr Giblin’s case and on a sanction, which could include dismissal and in O’Sullivan v. Mercy Hospital Cork the investigator produced adverse findings against the plaintiff employee without her being notified that this was happening; all offending the sanction rule.

In passing, there is some comfort in Judge Laffoy’s comments for owner managers conducting disciplinary proceedings in small businesses where compliance with SI 146/2000 (a document whose authors appear to have overlooked SME’s) can be very difficult, in relation to an appeal for example. (See also Mooney v An Post where the difficulties in complying with rigorous standards of fair procedure were sympathetically reviewed by Keane J. where he said that ‘the two great central principles – audi alteram partem and nemo iudex in causa sua – cannot be applied in a uniform fashion to every set of facts.)

I am more concerned here with the practise of external investigators.

If we can turn to Doherty & Anor v HSE [2008] IEHC 331 the court was addressing a different matter there which turned on the distinction between serious and gross misconduct.

But in this case the terms of reference of the investigator permitted a finding as to whether the allegations represented serious misconduct, which would then be followed by a disciplinary hearing to decide on sanction (so stopped short of the error in McLoughlin, Giblin and the Mercy Hospital, and fell within the ‘Minnock principle’).

So legally speaking this ought to be acceptable on the basis of Judge Laffoy’s observations in Giblin and subject to fair procedure rights being observed, as it meets the criteria outlined in O’Brien and Minnock in avoiding imposition of a sanction.

However, an assignment as an investigator, (or an investigator only) on this basis is something that should be considered carefully.

It is hard to know why any employer (a large employer in particular) would suffuse the two stages of the process rather than keeping clear water between its investigation and disciplinary stages and avoiding this rather odd hybrid adjudication process.

While it is technically true on the basis of the authorities reviewed here that a finding of serious misconduct is not per se ‘a sanction’ it brings a respondent to the edge of the sanction precipice. Viewed from the perspective of employment law or HR practitioners a conclusion on misconduct and a decision on sanction are much closer bedfellows than any link between a finding of fact resulting from an investigation and a conclusion on misconduct.

For example, a finding of serious misconduct automatically triggers a sanction as it is difficult to imagine any situation where it would not. The two are inextricably linked.

There does not appear to be any logic in separating the finding on conduct from the application of an appropriate remedy, and none in allowing it to be done outside the parameters of the recognised disciplinary procedures.

Indeed the opposite approach seems more logical. Investigations have been compared to the compilation of a ‘book of evidence’. To continue this analogy it would be absurd to separate a decision on guilt in the courts from the passing of a sentence.

Further, it will be recalled that in O’Brien v Aon Insurance Managers the court appeared willing to ignore ‘infirmities’ in the investigation provided the respondent had the right to have the full disciplinary hearing consider all facts ‘afresh’ and have the benefit of fair procedure applied at the hearing where they would be considered. This was seen as correcting ‘infirmities’ in the investigation and it underpins the clear water needed between the two processes and suggests that, even allowing that single ‘inquisitorial processes’ might escape adverse judicial attention separate is safer.

That said, in Minnock the court intervened to grant an injunction on the basis that the investigator did not confine himself to the ‘pure evidence gathering’ to which the rules of natural justice do not apply and was prepared to reach ‘findings’. Where exactly this stepped over a line of which the court disapproved is not clear, but it seems likely to have been a result of the defect in the Terms of Reference.

In any event even if it can be said that a finding of misconduct lies between a ‘pure investigation’ but falls short of a sanction it is too close for comfort to the latter for safety, or, in any case for best practise for investigators.

It may be of interest, if not legally then in relation to the practicalities of setting up and running the investigation that the plaintiffs in a number of these cases were very senior employees. O’Brien was MD of Aon, in Cribbin v PLC Ingredients the plaintiff was a Director and a 25% shareholder, McLoughlin was the General Manager in Setanta. It may be that the set up and planning of a workplace investigation in such cases requires greater care and attention to detail than with other employees, if only because if aggrieved they are more likely to reach for a legal remedy.

In Cribbin for example the investigator was a Senior Counsel, not normal in a workplace investigation, (although he was eventually discharged for failure to complete his report in time; perhaps a reminder to include the ‘due dispatch’ obligation that falls on arbitrators in any ‘CIArb Investigation Rules’.) There are defined time limits in the public service dignity at work ‘Positive Working Environment’ policy, for example, although they may be extended relatively easily by notification to the parties).

(See also cases related to delay (not included in this post); notably UD 705/2008 where the Employment Appeals Tribunal set out some guidelines on delay)

On a related point, investigators are often asked in Dignity at Work investigations to reach conclusions on facts AND whether they meet the definition of bullying.

Is this much different in principle to a finding of misconduct? Unlike misconduct there are some criteria against which bullying can be assessed and normally even a finding on bullying goes to the first stage of a disciplinary process anyway, or may even enter a mediation process.

Misconduct involves a much greater element of value judgement, often particular to the employment and is a form of adjudicative activity more associated with the formal disciplinary process both in practice and under the terms of procedures drafted under the Statutory Instrument on Grievance and Discipline SI146/2000).

As it turns out the decisions of the courts so far in relation to a finding of misconduct by an investigator would seem to protect a finding of bullying also so, given that it is even one further stage removed from the danger of a sanction than a finding of misconduct it is likely that the reservations expressed here about findings of misconduct do not apply to bullying.

Other issues which may arise under fair procedure requirements are entitlement to representation, sight of witness statements, etc. It is submitted that these should form part of a best practise model of conduct of investigations, although as with workplace discipline in general entitlement to legal representation is not favoured, and indeed provided the process falls within the Minnock decision principles it would appear not required (But see Burns v Governor of Castlerea Prison [2009] IESC 33)

There is much more, and I have not touched here on items 3-7 in the list on page one, although I have assembled a number of cases on all those topics. But I trust this brief survey of a important aspect of the legal principles which will form part of our future training of investigators has been of interest.

Also bearing in mind that many of the dicta referred to in this paper might be regarded as obiter or fact sensitive the professional standard for the investigators we train and recommend in CIArb should be sufficiently robust and watertight to withstand a more direct challenge in the future.

Our task now is to proceed from this understanding of the law in relation to investigations to construct professional standards which take the legal principles as a minimum but build on them to create a high, and recognisable standard for the practise of workplace investigations.

Pat Brady FCIArb

First delivered March 8th 2013

Posted May 12th 2013

Suggested Reading

  • Investigating complaints in the workplace-law and best practice

Paul Glenfield, Matheson Ormsby Prentice

  • Investigations in the workplace,

Terence McCrann , McCann FitzGerald Solicitors

  • Disciplinary Procedures; the pitfalls of a flawed Investigation

Kieran O’Callaghan BL in ‘The Parchment’ DSBA, Spring 2013

  • Workplace Investigations,

Dominic Wilkinson BL, in IRN 46/2006

The Workplace Investigation and the Law. Part 2

While avoiding unnecessary scrutiny by the High Court is a prudent consideration for any of us, this is not a defensive exercise only. We should seek to go beyond that thinking and move towards developing a best practise model that would be legally watertight for the long term but moreover provide comfort to the parties involved that they were getting the exercise they had signed up for, and contribute to a resolution of the issue in hand (or at least not make it more difficult).

This model should resemble for investigators what the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators standards and rules provide for arbitrators and mediators. (These can be viewed at

Indeed, where investigations have been the subject of scrutiny and adverse review by the courts or the tribunals some of the problems might simply be said to represent generally poor standards of professionalism in the conduct of an investigation (while of course there are many highly professional investigators doing excellent work).

For example, in the Minnock case discussed below it appears that neither the employer nor the investigator saw fit to produce proper Terms of Reference for the investigation and this became a factor in the court in intervening in the process, (or as it described it there was a ‘failure to set out what the process was going to be’).

Similar failures were criticised by Laffoy J. in Cribbin v PLC Ingredients.

While ensuring a high standard of professionalism in the management and conduct of these investigations would instil confidence in the investigation process and in CIArb accredited practitioners among those who require their services, it would also, as a consequence keep those practitioners well clear of legal hazards. This is not least because the requirements of a well conducted investigation in most respects will exceed the demand of fair procedure in any case.

In fact I would favour the production of a document along the lines of the Institute’s Arbitration or Mediation rules which clearly states for the public benefit the standards to which CIArb practitioners would be accountable.

I won’t dwell on the jurisprudence in relation to fair procedure with this audience.

These are some of the cases which have given our citizens the constitutional protections which they now enjoy; the principle well summed up in Glover as requiring ‘the machinery for taking decisions which may affect rights or impose liabilities [to] be construed as providing for fair procedure.

  • In re Haughey [1971] IR 271
  • Glover v BLN [1973] IR 388
  • State (Gleeson) v Minister of Defence
  • Cassidy v Shannon Castle Banquets
  • Gallagher v the Revenue Commissioners
  • Delaney v Central Bank [2011] IEHC 212

I might pause at Delaney not to deal with the decision in this case which extended the fair procedure standard to decisions of medical practitioners in certain circumstances but for another, cautionary reason of interest to workplace investigators and this presentation.

Judge Laffoy referred to the Investigator by name thirty-nine times in the course of her judgement, and otherwise another nine times. So further reason for ensuring that you should not set sail lightly on the seas of workplace investigations. You need to carry out your work (as the investigator did in this case and the court found no fault with him) knowing that this degree of scrutiny is a possibility.

In this paper I would like to reflect on some of the issues which have arisen regarding the applicability of fair procedure to the investigation phase of the process itself and the following cases are relevant.

 Minnock v. Irish Casing Co. Ltd. and Stewart [2007] ELR 229

O’Brien v. AON Insurance Managers (Dublin) Ltd. [2005] IEHC 3

Morgan v TCD [2003] 3 I.R. 157

Looking at the Minnock case Clarke J. said that ‘as a matter of law the authorities are beginning to settle on the appropriate test to be applied in cases of this nature’, and went on to describe the spectrum of ‘preliminary inquiries’ that may be carried out (preliminary to disciplinary proceedings in this case).

At one end he located ‘the pure investigation’ where no findings of any sort are made by the investigator (other than that a formal disciplinary process is warranted) to the other end of the spectrum where the investigator gathers the facts and makes formal findings.

Clarke J. made it is clear that the authorities say a pure investigation which does not involve any findings whatsoever is not a matter to which the rules of natural justice apply. It is not therefore a matter appropriate for the court to intervene.

On the other hand, where an investigator is permitted to make findings, the court said that it appears to be settled from the majority of the authorities that the rules of natural justice do apply and the court may well need to consider if it is appropriate to intervene where there is evidence to suggest the manner in which the investigation is being carried out is seriously flawed.

This opens the obvious question as to the definition of ‘a finding’. It would be hard to imagine an investigator’s report without findings in the ordinary sense of the word.

Fortunately, this was addressed in the earlier case of O’Brien v AON Insurance Managers (Dublin) Ltd. [2005] IEHC 3 where again Clarke J (relying on dicta in Morgan v TCD [2003]3 I.R. 157 per Kearns J) said that where the recommendations of the investigators report do not ‘amount to a sanction’ Haughey rights do not apply especially as the plaintiff would still be entitled to have all these matters considered at a later disciplinary hearing.

 He said that this was the case that even if there were ‘infirmities’ in the investigation which affected the report of the investigator because it did not amount to a sanction that would require the court to intervene. (See also UK EAT case Santamera v Express Cargo Forwarding t/a IEC Ltd (2003) IRLR 273 where it was held that an investigation will not be unfair even if individual components were.)

On this basis adherence to the principles in Judge Clarke’s summary of the law in Minnock are obviously the safest bet for an investigator.

 In the next piece I will discuss cases which stray beyond the pure investigation

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The Workplace Investigation and the Law Part 1

Paper delivered to a conference organised by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the Irish Association of Women Lawyers, Arbitral Women and the Law Society on Conflict Resolution: Celebrating Women as ADR Leaders

The bungled workplace investigation ‐ a look at the pitfalls of poorly investigated conflict and the real cost of badly managed complaints.

This is the first of three installments of this paper that I will publish in the coming days


The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators is a broad church of dispute resolvers across many professions; construction, the law, financial services, other commercial sectors and the employment sphere. Our members are arbitrators, construction adjudicators, mediators and practise other dispute resolution processes.

Until now, we had no quality assured standards, panels or approved training in the way we do with other dispute resolvers. (Neither incidentally has anyone else but we decided to do something about it.)

We have done so by developing a course in workplace investigations and our ambition is to offer the legal profession, employers and others who seek it the comfort of a unique cadre of practitioner investigators trained to a good standard exactly as we do with arbitrators and mediators.

First we had to define the skillset needed for the conduct of an investigation; from the planning and set up stage through case management, interviewing techniques including with vulnerable interviewees, decision making and report writing.

Because workplace investigations are often linked to the disciplinary process the general framework of the law on discipline and dismissal overarches all of this. Indeed there is now something one might describe as the law relating to workplace investigations as a sub set of employment law. For example, a recent (Unreported so far, 21st December 2012) High Court decision: Patrick Kelly v Minister for Agriculture and Others addressed the obligation to provide witness statements during an investigation. (per Hedigan J.)

With a number of distinguished exceptions (and some further reading will appear at the end of the final piece) this has not yet got the detailed attention it deserves. Our purpose was not to add to the academic study of the law but to provide practitioners with practical guidance on pitfalls they should avoid, and to assist us in developing a best practice model for the conduct of investigations.

The starting point was to identify those potential problems which could result in adverse consequences for the workplace investigation (and investigator). This is ‘work in progress’ as decisions of the EAT, for example are a nightmare for the researcher as the EAT database is not searchable by case type. This is happily going to change as part of the reform of the Employment Rights bodies.

Why an investigation? Lets start not at, but just before the beginning. Why is investigation needed at all?

It is important to answer this question initially for HR professionals who are likely to make the first decision on this.

It is now quite common to include a commitment to hold an investigation as part of the disciplinary procedure incorporated in Contracts of Employment. In such cases the employee has a contractual right to an investigation

It may be required by Codes of Practice (on bullying, for example,) or by best practice compliance with fair procedure requirements, bearing in mind the relationship to possible later disciplinary procedures; a point discussed later.

In the case of a possible dismissal the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 says at section 6 (1)

Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

The EAT has said: “In deciding whether or not the dismissal of the claimant was unfair we apply a test of reasonableness to:

  • the nature and extent of the enquiry carried out by the respondent prior to the decision to dismiss the claimant, and
  • the conclusion arrived at by the respondent that, on the basis of the information resulting from such enquiry, the claimant should be dismissed

Hennessy v Read & Write Shop Ltd UD 192/1978

And this case was noted with approval more recently in Michael Morales v Carton Bros UD 835/2011 although in that case the employer was held to have reached a disproportionate conclusion despite having had a good investigation, in other words failing to meet the ‘substantial grounds’ test in the Unfair Dismissals Act.

The UK EAT (which it should be noted is a division of the High Court) has similarly held;

First of all, there must be established by the employer the fact of that belief; that the employer did believe it. Secondly, that the employer had in his mind reasonable grounds upon which to sustain that belief. And thirdly, we think, that the employer, at the stage at which he formed that belief on those grounds, at any rate at the final stage at which he formed that belief on those grounds, had carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. British Home Stores v Burchell (1980) ICR 303 EAT

(For other UK authorities on investigations see Midland Bank v Madden (2000) ICR 1283 CA, Garry V London Borough of Ealing (2001) IRLR681 CA Tesco Stores Ltd v Pryke (2006) EAT)

So for the purpose of informing any disciplinary proceedings against an employee in addition to the considerations above it is obviously important that an employer is sure of the relevant facts before pressing on with those proceedings.

(On the issue of suspension pending an investigation see Khan v HSE [2008] IEHC 234 and McNamara v South Western Health Board [2001] IEHC 24. Essentially the applicability of fair procedure turned as in the cases below on whether the suspension added up to a sanction).

But returning to the pitfalls the following agenda of headings emerged as needing attention in developing an understanding of the law and investigations.

  1. Fair procedure
    1. General principles
    2. Applicability to Investigations
    3. Suspension pending investigation
  2. Crossover into disciplinary
  3. Failure to carry out investigation
  4. Inadequate/Flawed investigation
  5. Delay
  6. Independence of Investigator
  7. Standard of proof

While avoiding unnecessary scrutiny by the High Court is a prudent consideration for any of us, this should not be a defensive exercise only. We want to go beyond that thinking and move towards developing a best practise model that would be legally watertight for the long term but moreover provide comfort to the parties involved that they were getting the exercise they are entitled to get, and contribute to a resolution of the issue in hand.

It should resemble for investigators what the Institute’s standards and rules provide for arbitrators and mediators. (These can be viewed at

In the next piece I take a brief look only at one of these issues; how fair procedure principles impact on the investigation.

Not quite Urbe et Orbe, but what are the employment law issues in 2013?

Workplace Solutions ID (Small)For practitioners it’s hard not to look beyond two hoped for and very important developments in the area of dispute resolution. The biggest industrial relations issues of the year are likely to arise from public service reform, but here I deal only with employment law developments.

The first of those is the reforms of the employment rights institutions proposed by Richard Bruton, Minister for Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation. After a year of very substantial progress through the consultation phase, eventually (apparently) getting an initial green light from cabinet these proposals are somewhat behind target.

It’s not that nothing has happened. Far from it.

Some of the reforms introduced through the Workplace Relations service have been a big help but a number of the ‘big ticket’ proposals in the new adjudication system have been the subject of criticism on legal grounds from some lawyers, in particular in relation to possible breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights (article 6). Among the main critics has been the Employment Bar Association and you can read its views here.

The precise resolution of some of the issues raised here may initially require some important decisions in the office of the Attorney-General, and ultimately in the courts.

The key issues appear to concern the failure to guarantee a role for practising lawyers in the new system, not as a narrow vested interest position but as they see it to protect the rights of the complainant to a fair process.

Most practitioners are just  keen to see the new system up and running as soon as possible especially given the widespread and serious criticism of delays at the EAT and other issues. This has not helped the lawyers’ case even though it is unfair to attribute responsibility for the problems at the EAT in all cases to the fact that there are lawyer Chairs.

That said many claims coming before the EAT do not involve serious points of law, (or often none I would say) and many non practising lawyers have a good knowledge of employment law and workplace culture, which many professional lawyers lack.

(My own views on this in my submission to the DJEI review can be read here.)

The second main area of interest and one which goes beyond employment rights issues is the Mediation Bill. It was disappointing that the Bill; promised for publication last Autumn failed to materialise, with enactment into law now months away.

It is disappointing in that we are now behind many European countries in providing a statutory framework for this form of alternative dispute resolution especially as the ADR community in Ireland is relatively united in its support for the published framework for the Bill. The EU Presidency is likely to be a factor that will delay it further.

Outside the sphere of workplace dispute resolution ADR has a vital contribution to make to reducing costs in the economy for professional services; indeed it is in this context that it appears in the Programme for Government. It should not be delayed!

The Retirement age conundrum

Moving on, we are now under twelve months to an increase in the eligibility age for old age pensions. From January 2014 this will become 66 years of age. I’m willing to bet a lot of workers whose 64th birthday falls this year are not aware of this and there’ll be a reaction to learning that they will not be getting their pension at 65 as anticipated. (And you fifty somethings should note that this rises again to 67 in 2021, and 68 in 2028)

The law in relation to retirement age is developing and in my opinion far from fully clear. It is a separate issue to the pension age, but what is clear is that in the absence of objective reason to justify it compulsory retirement at 65 may constitute discrimination.

(See the case of Elizabeth Sweeney v Aer Lingus Teo (DEC-E2012-135); a case which illustrates the importance of the ”objective justification’ principle.) Ms Sweeney got an award of €5,000 because Aer Lingus failed to establish thather retirement at 65 “served a legitimate aim, or purpose”.

I anticipate that rather as happened with other discriminatory barriers such as gender, the increased volume of cases which will result from increasing awareness of the problem may see the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) push the boundaries out even further and our Equality Tribunal has had to move beyond existing Irish legislative provision to ensure compliance with the CJEU authority.  (More interesting material on this from the European Labour Lawyers Network here

Advice to employers and employees?

Start talking to each other, and if you are the employer, do it carefully! But it would be unwise to postpone doing so. Even if the employment contract specifies a retirement age of 65 I expect that many employees will challenge this on age discrimination grounds and either way employers will be drawn in to conflict on the issue. I can advise further on avoiding this.

And other issues?

It will also be interesting to see the impact of the 2012 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act on the JLC and REA scene. After all the fuss the Bill got a reasonable reaction from the social partners and came into force last July although a number of cases are before the High Court and due to be decided upon.

Also the process of rationalising (i.e. reducing the number of) JLC’s has, I understand, begun. Watch this space!

Annual Leave

The CJEU also made an important ruling last year in relation to annual leave entitlement during sick leave. Basically, the annual leave may be taken at a later date and outside the reference period, or if they have been out sick for a whole year entitlement to annual leaver persists. Irish statute law currently provides otherwise and will have to be amended to tale account of the CJEU decisions.

Finally, May 2012 also saw the enactment of the Temporary Agency Workers Directive in Ireland. However, as this is of relatively minority interest I invite anyone with queries to contact me at

Happy New Year!

The staff Xmas party…too much cheer could cost you dear

I know, I know, the party poopers are at it again. But just dusting down some seasonal advice might save you a lot of trouble, and cost!

(This is an updated version of a post from last year, and I thought it may be helpful to run it again.)

The fact is the Christmas party (or other social events, or work events away from the normal workplace) gives rise to obligations and may be covered by employment rights law. In any event they are covered by general legal provisions, on sexual assault for example.

Bullying legislation refers to behaviour ‘at the place of work or in the course of employment’ and while a single act will not constitute bullying the same does not apply to harassment, and that normally means sexual harassment.

This is defined (in broad terms) as inappropriate or unwanted verbal or physical behaviour and could result in a complaint by a victim of such behaviour under the company  ‘Dignity at Work ‘ policy (if you don’t have one…you should!)

And after the ‘rake of pints,’ shots and general bravado the insight necessary to distinguish between acceptable and unaceptable behaviour may diminish, with consequences for colleagues who have a clear legal entitlement to be free of certain types of  unacceptable behaviour. And this could cover a wide range of behaviours!

And this could include the line between sexual harassment and sexual assault (which is a crime). It’s not as wide as may be thought in the macho mind.

And while these comments have focussd on sexual harassment there are other aspects to dignity at work which may also be offended. We now have minorities in Ireland whose right to equal treatment is enshrined in law.

I referred last year to an article in the Sunday Business Post by solicitor Linda Hynes of Leman Solicitors  to a fight at an office party in Malahide which resulted in an unfair dismissal and cost the employer €150,000! 

And the employer may be liable for such behaviour if  s/he has not taken reasonable steps to prevent or address it.  Linda Hynes’ excellent checklist on Work Place social events can be accessed here 

The Small Firms Association has noted that:

‘Employers must be aware that the party venue is basically an extension of the office and that they remain responsible for the well-being, protection and behaviour of employees during such events.  Employers should make note in a work function invitation that appropriate behaviour is required at the party.’

If you need more information contact and see Equality page on this site